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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A REEXAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERSON
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Blackmun declares, “the word ‘person’ as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not include the unborn.”1 In support, he references the use
of person in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the appearance of ‘person’
in other parts of the body of the Constitution and its Amendments.2 The
language of the Fourteenth Amendment begins “All persons born or
naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens.”3 The due process clause
states “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,”4 and
the equal protection clause “nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”5 This first section, and the comment in its
entirety, asserts Justice Blackmun’s interpretation of ‘person’ excluding the
unborn under the Fourteenth Amendment ignores the philosophical and legal
conclusions of the Founders of the United States of America, legislative action,
and biological facts.
The second section explores the legal definition of ‘person’ under the
Constitution of the United States, drawing from Roe, an amicus appellate brief,
legal precedent, and state legislative action. The amicus curiae brief for the
appellee, submitted by the Association of Texas Diocesan Attorneys
(“Diocesan Attorneys”), states: “The great issue in this case is whether the
unborn child or foetus is a person within the meaning of the constitutional
safeguards of the person contained in the Constitution of the United States, and
especially in its Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Ninth Amendments.”6
In framing their argument, the Diocesan Attorneys asserted the concept of
‘person’ utilized in the Constitution and its first ten Amendments clearly
included the unborn.7 Regarding philosophy, the Diocesan Attorneys’ brief in

1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
2. Id. at 157.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
6. Brief for Ass’n of Tex. Diocesan Attorneys as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee at 7,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18), 1971 WL 134282 [hereinafter Amicus Curiae
Brief].
7. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 8 (arguing the framers of the Constitution
considered the unborn child the subject of rights which included the right to life and a duty on the
part of society and the child’s parents to care for and support the unborn child)
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Roe asserted the concept of ‘person’ in the Constitution and first ten
Amendments included the unborn because of the religious motivation,
philosophy of natural rights, and the views of the framers and adopters of the
Constitution.8 In contrast, the holding espoused by Justice Blackmun concludes
all the instances where ‘person’ appears in the Constitution applies only postnatally, or after birth.9
The third section illustrates that certain areas of the law provide the unborn
with protections despite the holding in Roe. It has been posited the application
of Justice Blackmun’s personhood definition has mistakenly denied the unborn
non-Fourteenth Amendment rights and limited the discretion of American
lawmakers in characterizing personhood.10 In California and other states,
statutes criminalize the nonconsensual killing of an “unborn child” as murder
or manslaughter, implying a definition for ‘person’ incongruous with that laid
out by Justice Blackmun in Roe.11 States continue to enact variations on fetal
and pregnant woman assault.12 Under most inheritance and trust laws the
unborn are considered a ‘person’, despite no such consideration under the
Fourteenth Amendment.13 This continuing response by the states implies at
least a form of emerging awareness in regard to the rights afforded to the
unborn.
Lastly, the fourth section covers biological and moral evidence supporting
the arguments provided by the Diocesan Attorneys, the appellee brief by Henry
Wade, and the states, all of whom see something worth protecting despite the
holding in Roe. Within the Diocesan Attorneys’ brief, the proposition was
declared “Life begins, not at birth, but at conception”, applying scientific
methods of the day.14 Modern science confirms the biological identity of a new
human individual is already constituted in the zygote resulting from
fertilization.15 Rule of law and rule by law is briefly examined in reference to
8. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 10–11.
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973).
10. Jeffrey A. Parness & Susan K. Pritchard, To Be or Not to Be: Protecting the Unborn’s
Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 257, 258 (1982).
11. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 598–99 (Cal. 1994) (including Arizona, Illinois,
Louisiana, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Utah, and the Judges of the California Supreme Court
concluded “when the mother’s privacy interests are not at stake, the Legislature may determine
whether, and at what point, it should protect life inside a mother’s womb from homicide”).
12. See Monthly State Update: MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN 2014, Pregnancy and Birth,
Fetal and Pregnant Woman Assault, GUTTMACHER INST., (Dec. 31, 2014), https://www.gutt
macher.org/statecenter/updates/december.html#assault.
13. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 257.
14. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 65 (a conclusion formed by Professor R. Ashley
Montagu citing ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 1776–1791 119–
218 (1955).
15. WILLIAM E. MAY, CATHOLIC BIOETHICS AND THE GIFT OF HUMAN LIFE 34 (3rd ed.
2013).
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the Casey decision succeeding Roe. Lastly, Evangelium Vitae, a Catholic
Church document, is referenced for its position that every innocent human
being possesses a right to life.16
This comment asserts ‘person’ under the Fourteenth Amendment includes
the unborn through support from the appellee briefs, reference to the thinking
of the Founders, common law and legislative precedent, current state
approaches concerning the unborn, and persuasive evidence of biology and
philosophy. Depriving the unborn of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,
yet recognizing laws beyond the Fourteenth Amendment protecting the
unborn, has established an untenable dichotomy. The Supreme Court must
recognize the rights of all persons under the Constitution.
II. THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF PERSONHOOD
A.

Roe, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Constitutional Articles

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment references ‘person’ three times:
first in the requirements for a citizen, second in the due process clause, and
third in the equal protection clause.17 The phrase “persons born” makes a sole
appearance in reference to the requirements for citizenship of the United States
and of the state where said ‘person’ resides.18 The due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment mention ‘person’ without
born as a descriptor.19 Textually, this implies “persons born” is in reference to
the requirements for citizenship, not that a Constitutional ‘person’ requires
birth.
Justice Blackmun holds, however, ‘person’ only ever operates post-natally
in the Fourteenth Amendment and the Constitution at large.20 References by
the Justice include the requirements for representatives and senators in Article
I, and the Fifth, Twelfth, and Twenty-Second Amendments.21 The sections
where ‘person’ is mentioned in the Constitution seemingly affirm this postnatal status. For example, “No person shall be a Representative who shall not
have attained the Age of twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a citizen of
the United States.”22 However, a pre-natal definition was argued by the
Diocesan Attorneys in their amicus curiae brief in Roe.

16. Ioannes Paulus PP. II, Evangelium Vitae, VATICAN.VA (Mar. 25, 1995) point 71,
http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evan
gelium-vitae.html.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3–4.
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973).
21. Id.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
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As the Founders Intended

An appellee brief written by the Texas Diocesan Attorneys asserted as an
originalist argument: “The concept of the person utilized in the Constitution of
the United States and in its first ten Amendments had a well-defined meaning
for those who framed and adopted their provisions that clearly included the
unborn child.”23
To achieve this point, the Diocesan Attorneys pointed out rules of the
Constitution must be considered “rules for the government of courts.”24 The
Diocesan Attorneys argued that this included rules of the Constitution
safeguarding the ‘person’, including its appearances in the Fifth, Fourteenth,
and Ninth Amendments.25 As a result, the Court in Roe would be tasked with
determining the appropriate meaning of person “used by the framers of the
Constitution in establishing its fundamental safeguards of the person.”26
It is noted that the people of the United States, including John Adams and
Thomas Jefferson, were so greatly concerned at the lack of a bill of rights
guaranteeing the freedom of the person that the Federalists agreed to propose
and submit a comprehensive Bill of Rights at the First Congress in 1789.27 The
Diocesan Attorneys insisted the religious motivation, philosophy of natural
rights, and views of the ‘person’ on the part of the framers and adopters of the
Constitution could not be disregarded by the Court.28 Boyd v. United States is
cited where Justice Bradley declared:
. . . constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be
liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their
efficacy and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in
sound than in substance. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
29
thereon.

The implication was that restricting who is covered by the word ‘person’ in the
Constitution dangerously threatens the rights of the people.
To further establish their originalist argument, the Diocesan Attorneys
invoked James Wilson as an illustration. James Wilson helped formulate, voted

23. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 8.
24. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 9 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 179–80
for the proposition by Chief Justice Marshall “that the framers of the Constitution contemplated
[the Constitution] as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature.”).
25. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 9.
26. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 9.
27. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 10.
28. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 10–11.
29. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 12 (citing 116 U.S. 616, 635 where notice to
produce an invoice and the law supporting such notice resulting in self-incrimination was ruled
unconstitutional).
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for, and signed the Declaration of Independence, participated in the
Constitutional Convention, signed the proposed Constitution of the United
States, and served as an Associate Justice for the Supreme Court of the United
States.30 He was a professor of law at the College of Pennsylvania while
serving on the Supreme Court, knowledgeable of the philosophy of natural
law, and of a position to articulate the meaning and concept of ‘person’
generally shared by his fellow citizens, particularly as it was “woven into the
sinews of the colonial and state Bill of Rights and finally into the Constitution
of the United States.”31
Justice Wilson commented “Persons are divided into two kinds – natural
and artificial. Natural persons are formed by the great Author of nature.
Artificial persons are the creatures of human sagacity and contrivance; and are
formed and intended for the purposes of society.”32 The Constitutional Fathers
did not see ‘person’ as something subject to man’s contrivance, like that of the
corporation or state.33 The Diocesan Attorneys stressed the Founders saw “The
status of person was not something to be conferred by the state or even all the
people of the state”, a ‘person’ simply is and has being by virtue of an act of
creation by God himself.34
One of the most influential thinkers relied upon by the Founders, John
Locke, expressed the view that men by nature being free, equal, and
independent, cannot be put out of this state by another without his own
consent.35 Essentially, a person, whether child or adult, was deemed superior to
the state and to its law, even that of the Constitution.36 The original documents
of the United States further make the relationship of man to the state clear. For
example, the Declaration of Independence holds:
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit
of Happiness . . . That to secure these rights Governments are instituted among
37
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . .

As the Founders saw it, these rights were given by an authority greater than
any manmade state, and the state existed by the grace of those whom it
governed. In addition, if birth were seen as the beginning of life then they
likely would have written “that all men are born equal.”

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 14.
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 14.
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 14.
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 15.
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 15.
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 18.
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 18.
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 19 (emphasis added in original).
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Thomas Jefferson was familiar with the laws of England as far back as the
Laws of King Alfred, which penalized the killing of a pregnant woman and
that of her unborn child, requiring payment for the killing of both.38 This
example and those listed above stand for the proposition that the Founders and
colonial Americans respected and considered the unborn as persons created by
God.39 This approach was drawn from English thinking, as was noted with
John Locke, and also from William Blackstone who cited in his Commentaries,
“Life. This right is inherent by nature in every individual, and exists even
before the child is actually born.”40
The Diocesan Attorneys observed a disregard for the “religious
motivations, philosophy of natural rights, and the views of the person
entertained by the framers and adopters of the Constitution . . .” is no basis to
declare invalid the will of those who formed the foundation of the U.S. system
of government, especially those parts which dealt with the safeguards of the
person.41 Following from the interpretation in Boyd by Justice Bradley,
constitutional provisions dealing with the security of persons should be
liberally construed, requiring ‘person’ in the Constitution cover not just those
already born but those yet to be.42 The Founders utilized natural law, which
insists the natural person is a creation of God, not of man like a corporation
would be, and this natural person exists before the arbitrary boundary of
birth.43 Once a limit is placed on the protections afforded one group of persons,
the protections for all are put in jeopardy. If rights are not based on something
permanent and absolute then they are subjective, and in this subjective state
they are vulnerable to the mutable nature of popular opinion. The Declaration
of Independence recognizes we are “created equal”, and if the Founders of the
United States thought otherwise they likely would have written we are “born
equal.”
C. As the Drafters Wrote
Additionally, one can make a textual argument for the recognition of rights
for the unborn. The Diocesan Attorneys assert in their appellee brief the
citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes the unborn child
as a person.44 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, “All persons
born . . . in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens

38. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 22.
39. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 24.
40. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 24–25.
41. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 10–11.
42. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 27.
43. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 26; see also Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at
15 (discussing corporation and natural law).
44. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 33.
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of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”45 Discussion by the
draftsman, John A. Bingham of Ohio, concerning § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment expressed:
By that great law of ours it is not to be inquired whether a man is ‘free’ by the
law of England; it is only to be inquired is he a man, and therefore free by the
law of that creative energy which breathed into his nostrils the breath of
46
life . . . endowed with the rights of life and liberty.

This sentiment finishes, in words reminiscent of the Declaration of
Independence, “Every man is entitled to the protection of American law,
because its divine spirit of equality declares that all men are created equal.”47
A central purpose of the Citizenship clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to make certain that black Americans, and every other class
of person, obtained the rights of citizenship in addition to those natural rights
they received upon conception from God.48 This purpose was considered so
fundamental Representative William Lawrence of Ohio in 1866 believed it was
unnecessary to put in writing, saying “This clause is unnecessary, but
nevertheless proper, since it is only declaratory of what is the law without it.”49
Even with the Citizenship clause explicitly written, Justice Blackmun found a
means to disregard the draftsmen with a false analogy. He concluded because
abortion practices were legal in some instances in the 19th century that ‘person’
could in no way include the unborn in the Fourteenth Amendment.50 This is
similar to proposing that because many people believed for years the sun
orbited the earth, that the view the earth orbited the sun is invalid on its face.
Existence of a mistaken belief does not suffice as definitive proof against the
right conclusion.
The Diocesan Attorneys assert the Citizenship clause of § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment fully includes the unborn, among others.51 “The
unborn child is the ‘person’ before birth who, by virtue of being ‘born’ in the
United States, becomes a citizen of the United States,” they write.52 As the
unborn are included within the Citizenship clause, they too must be recognized
to have the right to claim protection from the federal courts for their
prospective status of citizenship upon birth.53 Otherwise, the present status quo
arises, which was predicted by the Diocesan Attorneys in their brief.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 33–34.
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 34 (emphasis added).
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 34.
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 34–35.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 36.
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 36.
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 36.
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If the unborn cannot obtain protection from their prospective status as
citizens, then citizenship becomes a precarious right.54 Citizenship cannot be
acquired by birth if a person is not allowed to be born.55 If the rights of
citizenship are to be effectively protected, an unborn child must be recognized
to possess a prospective right to citizenship.56
The esteemed Court turned down the above reasoning in favor of an
interpretation stating the obvious: ‘person’ does not indicate it has prenatal
applications in the Constitution.57 References to ‘person’ by the Court include
the requirements for Representatives and Senators in Article I, the Fifth,
Twelfth, and Twenty-Second Amendments.58 For example, “No person shall
be a Representative who shall not have attained the Age of twenty five Years,
and been seven Years a citizen of the United States.”59 The use of ‘person’
here indeed applies after birth, but it also does not apply to children or
adolescents. Yet to conclude this section makes children and adolescents
nonpersons because it does not refer to them would be entertained by no one.
But this is exactly what Justice Blackmun concluded in Roe; because ‘person’
in the Constitution is referring to someone after birth, and only after, those
before birth are not included in the definition of ‘person’.60 As citizenship
rights activate upon birth, denying citizenship today is as simple as ending a
pregnancy prior to labor. The Diocesan Attorneys recognized when they wrote
their brief that the prospective right of citizenship had to be recognized,
otherwise citizenship means nothing.
III. PERSONHOOD IN THE STATES
Areas outside the Fourteenth Amendment frequently afford the unborn
protections. This raises important questions. Foremost is why the unborn are
afforded protection outside the Fourteenth Amendment, but within it they are
subject to the determination of the mother? This section will attempt to show
the inherent contradiction of law present where protections are provided in one
area but denied in another.
In To Be or Not to Be: Protecting the Unborn’s Potentiality of Life, it is
presented that a misunderstanding of the Roe decision caused courts to
mistakenly deny the unborn non-Fourteenth Amendment protections to which

54. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 36.
55. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 37.
56. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 37 (illustrating this argument using prospective
jurisdiction of courts in judicial proceedings and the actions necessary to preserve that
jurisdiction).
57. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973).
58. Id.
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
60. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
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they are entitled.61 The author, Professor Jeffrey Parness, summarizes the Roe
Court’s position as treating the unborn not as persons in the whole sense, while
recognizing the unborn can be treated as persons in many contexts.62 As
support, he noted the Fifth Circuit concluded:
An unborn child’s lack of status as a ‘person’ for Fourteenth Amendment
purposes does not affect the status of an unborn child as a ‘child’ within the
meaning of the [Social Security] Act; that a fetus is not constitutionally entitled
as a person to claim certain benefits in no way affects the right or power of
63
Congress to extend benefits to unborn children by appropriate legislation.

Even so, federal courts since Roe have failed to distinguish entitlement of
benefits under the Fourteenth Amendment from the issue of extension of
benefits to the unborn under other laws.64 State laws provide the best examples
of this dichotomy, and though numerous state laws affect the unborn, states
have not fully recognized the unborn due to misplaced reliance on the Roe
decision.65 Areas of state jurisdiction include inheritance, trusts, criminal law
and others.66 The authors stress these areas need to be addressed to promote
policies affecting the unborn.67
A.

Inheritance and Property

An individual in gestation at a decedent’s death is deemed to be living at
the decedent’s death if the individual lives 120 hours after birth.68 Similarly, if
the testator had no child living when he or she executed a will, an omitted
after-born child receives a share in the estate equal in value to that the child
would have received if the testator died intestate.69 Each of these sections of
the Uniform Probate Code (“U.P.C.”) recognize the unborn connected to the
intestate decedent or as the child of a testator, and vests rights in the unborn
contingent upon their live birth.70
Initially, this does not appear troubling as the argument can be made the
state has no interest in transferring property to an unborn who will not be
born.71 However, Parness highlights the state’s interest in promoting the
61. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 258.
62. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 261.
63. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 263 (citing Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861, 864 (5th Cir.
1974)).
64. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 263.
65. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 263.
66. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 263.
67. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 263.
68. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-104 (a)(2) (amended 2010).
69. Id. § 2-302 (a)(1).
70. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 264 (varying slightly in wording since Parness’ original
publication, where the relevant statute was U.P.C. § 2-108, but the argument remains unaffected).
71. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 265.
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unborn’s potential for life may be undermined by treating their interest as
contingent upon birth.72 Presumably, a wealthy, pregnant intestate might have
substantial incentive to abort the unborn child she is carrying to establish her
status as ‘surviving spouse’ to take the entire estate.73 The state has a
legitimate interest in “protecting the potentiality of human life” which warrants
an elimination of incentives to abort, especially since eliminating such an
incentive does not place an obstacle in the way of a pregnant woman’s right to
abortion.74
While Parness concludes the state’s interest protects the potentiality of
human life without interfering with a woman’s privacy right, this still ignores
the larger issue. The appellee brief submitted by the Diocesan Attorneys
argued the concept of property in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment primarily deal with state law.75 Because state law
recognizes property rights for the unborn, the Due Process Clause of both the
Amendments protect the unborn as a ‘person’.76 To provide otherwise
establishes an irrational contradiction,77 one observable today.
The handling exhibited by the U.P.C. above was inherited from the
common law of England, and recognizes the unborn child’s ability to take by
inheritance, dependent upon their birth.78 English courts recognized the
unborn’s rights in property law as early as 1795, and American courts utilized
a similar approach in Hall v. Hancock.79 Where it has been shown a state
recognizes the unborn child may take real or personal property under will or
statute of descent and distribution, there is a declaration the unborn is a
‘person’ to be protected with respect to their property right.80 Prior to the
holding in Roe, the Diocesan Attorneys insisted:
If the unborn child is a person protected as to its property under the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution

72. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 265.
73. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 265 (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (1)(A)
(amended 2010), where an intestate share of a decedent’s surviving spouse is entire if no
descendant or parent of the decedent survives the decedent).
74. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 265 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)).
75. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 38.
76. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 38.
77. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 38.
78. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 38.
79. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 39 (citing Doe v. Clark, 2 H.B1. 399, 126 Engl
Rep. 617 (1795) where the court held “children living at the time of [the life tenant’s] decease”
included unborn children, and Hall v. Hancock, 15 Pick, 255 (Mass., 1834) where Chief Justice
Shaw held an unborn child fell within the meaning of a bequest to grandchildren “living at my
decease”).
80. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 41.
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of the United States, the child must also be a person under the same clauses for
81
the purpose of the protection of its life and liberty.

They noted it would be a strange and bizarre doctrine that protected the
property of the unborn child under these Amendments, but not its life and
liberty.82 Life precedes liberty and property where it is listed in the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States,83 and life precedes liberty and the pursuit of happiness in the
Declaration of Independence.84 It may be reasonably inferred life was to take
the ultimate priority among these most important rights, for without life no
other right matters. “Thus, if any lesser right of the unborn child is protected
by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the
foundational right to life of the unborn child must also necessarily be protected
by them.”85
Yet today it is seen that the unborn are recognized to inherit property,86 but
receive no protections under the Fourteenth Amendment after Roe.87 It is truly
a strange and bizarre doctrine the Court devised in Roe, where ‘person’ does
not include the unborn, yet the unborn in areas of state law receive an interest
in property. Naturally these are two different things, which justifies two
different approaches. Or it is as the Diocesan Attorneys argued, that the unborn
should be considered a ‘person’ for the protection of the life and liberty due a
‘person’ under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?88
B.

Criminal Law

The unborn is not a ‘person’ under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, having no right to life, liberty, or property since Roe.89
Presumably, this leads one to conclude there is nothing of value prior to birth.
Yet California defines murder as the unlawful killing of a human being, or a
fetus, with malice aforethought.90 This applies wherever an act resulting in the
death of a fetus is not a therapeutic abortion, committed by a holder of a
physician’s or surgeon’s certificate to preserve the mother’s life, or where the
act was consented to by the mother of the fetus.91 Fetus is separately listed
from human being, implying these are two different things. But why then is the
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 41.
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 41.
U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 19.
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 41–42.
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-104 (a)(2) (amended 2010); Id. § 2-302(a).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 46.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (1872).
Id. § 187(b)(1–3).
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crime of murder attached to the unlawful killing of a fetus? That implies a
fetus is alive, because if nothing of value resides in a pregnant woman’s womb
it makes no sense to penalize someone on two counts of murder.
While Roe determined a state’s interest in protecting potential human life
arose at viability,92 the state of California held viability was not an element of
fetal murder.93 Previous cases in California made reference to viability
concerning § 187 of the California Penal Code (“§ 187”), interpreting Roe’s
stricture to mean only a fetus that had met the viability threshold could support
a conviction for fetal murder.94 The Defendant in Davis argued because the
fetus he killed could have been legally aborted under Roe it could not be
protected under § 187.95 But the California Supreme Court elaborated Roe
principles are inapplicable to a statute such as § 187 where killing a fetus
without the mother’s consent is criminalized.96 The Court plainly stated, “The
Roe decision, therefore, forbids the state’s protection of the unborn’s interest
only when these interests conflict with the constitutional rights of the
prospective parent.”97 And the Court concluded, “When the mother’s privacy
interests are not at stake, the Legislature may determine whether, and at what
point, it should protect the life inside a mother’s womb from homicide.”98
Interestingly, Roe causes confusion on the issue. As the Supreme Court of
California said, state legislatures may determine when the life in the mother’s
womb is protected from homicide absent the woman’s privacy interests. But if
there is a life inside the womb, how is it permissible to end it? How is it a
privacy right trumps a right to life? Indeed, the unborn is not a legal person,
but a Supreme Court of a state here said a fetus was life. These confusions
must be resolved.
In People v. Taylor, the California Supreme Court reviewed a case where
the appellate court reversed a second degree murder conviction based on the
death of a fetus.99 The appellate court concluded the mental component of
implied malice could not be met because the Defendant did not know his
conduct endangered fetal life due to an unawareness the victim was
pregnant.100 The California Supreme Court did not agree, commenting “There
is no requirement the defendant specifically know of the existence of each

92. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
93. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 594 (Cal. 1994).
94. Id. at 595 (citing People v. Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 830 (Ca. Ct. App. 1978) where §
187(a) was challenged as unconstitutionally vague for not specifying the required stage of
development of the fetus).
95. Id. at 597.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Davis, 872 P.2d at 599.
99. 86 P.3d 881, 883 (Cal. 2004).
100. Id.
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victim.”101 In past cases, the Court did not indicate a defendant was required to
have a subjective awareness of his particular victims for an implied malice
murder charge to proceed.102 The Court continued that nothing in the language
of § 187 allowed for a different analysis for a fetus.103 Just as a gunman firing
through closed doors of an apartment building would be held liable for the
murder of all the victims struck by his bullets, so too would he be held liable
for the death of a fetus if one of the victims happened to be pregnant.104 Again,
despite the pronouncement in Roe that a fetus is not a ‘person’ under the
Fourteenth Amendment,105 a State provides individuals may be charged with
two counts of murder when a woman is pregnant and not exercising a privacy
right. Where a defendant may be held responsible for the death of a fetus,
despite the lack of Constitutional personhood via Roe, there is an implied value
placed on the unborn.106 It seems a judicial system is out of synchronization
with its constituencies when it announces the unborn have no fundamental
rights to life, liberty, or property, and in the following days states find ways to
circumvent the announcement.
C. Emerging Awareness and the Majority Stance of the States
It can be argued whether the unborn should be recognized as persons under
the Fourteenth Amendment is still an unsettled question forty-two years later.
The Guttmacher Institute (“Institute”), originally formed within the corporate
structure of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America,107 reports in the
last four years states have enacted 231 abortion restrictions.108 Elizabeth Nash
and her co-authors note 341 provisions aimed at restricting access to abortion
were introduced in 2014 alone.109 And while the Institute recognizes
legislatures in seventeen states introduced ninety five measures to expand

101. Id. at 884.
102. Id. (citing People v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1981) where the defendant’s conduct,
under the influence of alcohol, was sufficiently wanton to support two charges of second degree
murder without any requirement that the defendant be subjectively aware of both victims).
103. Id.
104. People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881, 884 (Cal. 2004).
105. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
106. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 298; Mamta K. Shah, Inconsistencies in the Legal Status
of an Unborn Child: Recognition of a Fetus as Potential Life, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 931, 969
(2000-2001).
107. The History of the Guttmacher Institute, GUTTMACHER INST., (Feb. 15, 2014),
https://www.guttmacher.org/about/history.html.
108. Elizabeth Nash et al., Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2014 State Policy
Review, GUTTMACHER INST., (Feb. 15, 2014), https://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/
2014/statetrends42014.html.
109. Id.
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access to abortion,110 the large number of recently enacted abortion restrictions
dramatically reshaped the landscape.111
In 2000, thirteen states had four or five types of abortion restrictions in
place, causing the Institute to deem them hostile to what they call abortion
rights.112 In 2010, twenty two states were considered hostile to abortion rights,
with five of those states having six or more restrictions, resulting in a label of
extremely hostile.113 Ms. Nash and her colleagues reported in 2014, twenty
seven states had enough restrictions to be considered hostile to abortion rights,
with eighteen of those twenty seven being considered extremely hostile.114
Twenty seven states make up more than half those in the entire Union. These
twenty seven states possess stances against the widespread practice of the
abortion privacy right protected in Roe. This is at least an emerging awareness
of the value of unborn life since 2000, and now certainly a majority stance
against what Roe declares.
Variations on abortion restrictions include a value placed on prenatal life
through fetal murder statutes as showcased above in California. California,
however, is not the only state acting in this realm. In 2014, Colorado, Florida,
and Minnesota enacted variations on fetal and pregnant woman assault.115 June
of 2014 saw Colorado pass a measure allowing a woman to bring civil charges
against a person responsible for the unlawful termination of her pregnancy at
any point in gestation.116 At the same time, a Colorado bill provided exceptions
for actions by the pregnant woman and medical care,117 meaning a woman, or
abortion provider, may still obtain or provide an abortion and not be liable
under the bill. It specifically prohibits granting personhood rights to a fetus, in
line with the holding in Roe,118 yet still allows a woman to hold someone
responsible for terminating a wanted pregnancy. This supports the odd
approach the law has provided where the unborn are not persons under the
Fourteenth Amendment, yet are given some forms of protection that push
against, but do not infringe, upon the privacy right proclamation from Roe.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Nash et al., supra note 108.
114. Nash et al., supra note 108 (recording the twenty-seven hostile states include Idaho,
Utah, Arizona, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Wisconsin,
Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi,
Alabama, Florida, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Rhode
Island).
115. Monthly State Update: MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN 2014, Pregnancy and Birth, Fetal
and Pregnant Woman Assault, GUTTMACHER INST., (Dec. 31, 2014), https://www.guttmacher.
org/statecenter/updates/december.html#assault.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
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Florida enacted a similar measure, making it a crime to cause the injury or
death of a fetus at any point of development, with exceptions for abortion,
medical treatment, and actions by the pregnant woman.119 Florida’s fetal
homicide law currently applies only to viable fetuses.120 But again, here is a
state recognizing the essential holding of Roe while attempting to protect the
unborn child. Yet Florida applies a definition outside the Fourteenth
Amendment, making it a crime to injure or kill a fetus at least after the point of
viability. Why is it a wanted unborn child is protected, but an unwanted unborn
child may be aborted? Both situations terminate the pregnancy, but in one an
individual potentially receives two counts of murder, while in the other the
pregnancy is ended and the provider and once mother go separate ways with no
legal sanction.
Lastly, Minnesota’s governor signed into law a measure allowing
individuals to be prosecuted for causing injury or death to a fetus while driving
a vehicle negligently or under the influence.121 Even the pregnant woman is not
explicitly exempted from prosecution under the law, which goes into effect
August 1st of 2015.122 Again a state lines up with Roe, yet is providing
whatever means it can around Roe’s holding to provide the unborn with some
form of protection. It is apparent the law says the unborn are not persons under
the Fourteenth Amendment, but the treatment of the unborn outside the
Fourteenth Amendment says otherwise.
The twenty seven states enacting restrictions on abortion, and the examples
of unborn life being valued by fetal murder statutes in California, Colorado,
Florida, and Minnesota support the proposition that the unborn have a value,
despite what the Supreme Court declared in 1973.123 Neither are these
approaches unprecedented, as penalties for the death of a fetus long predate
these contemporary examples. In English Common Law, upon which the
United States’ system of law is based, during the lifetime of William
Blackstone, legal protection of the fetus from homicide began at the
“quickening”, when it was assumed life began for the unborn.124 Quickening
was understood then, and now, as the first motion of the fetus in the uterus felt
by the mother.125 Thirteenth Century writers Bracton and Fleta ruled killing an

119. Monthly State Update: MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN 2014, Pregnancy and Birth, Fetal
and Pregnant Woman Assault, GUTTMACHER INST., (Dec. 31, 2014), https://www.guttmacher.
org/statecenter/updates/december.html#assault.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Nash et al., supra note 108; Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
124. Charles I. Lugosi, Rule of Law: When Person and Human Being Finally Mean the Same
Thing in Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 22 Issues L. & Med. 119, 172 (2006–07).
125. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, “quickening”, available at http://www.merriam-web
ster.com/medical/quickening (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).
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unborn child where there was evidence of quickening was homicide.126
Blackstone, Bracton, Fleta, and others repeatedly referred to the unborn as
“child” and not “potential life”.127 Henry de Bracton in the Twelfth Century
stated “If there is anyone who strikes a pregnant woman or gives her a poison
which produces an abortion, if the foetus be already formed or animated, and
especially if it be animated, he commits homicide.”128
Everything which has been cited above supports value being placed on the
unborn as possessing a life, or something worth protecting. If indeed it was
widely believed the fetus were nothing other than a collection of cells there
would not be twenty seven states restricting abortion, states among that
number supporting fetal murder statutes for wanted pregnancies, and
provisions providing the unborn to take under intestacy and property laws.
This opposition is due to the fact the unborn possesses life from the moment of
conception, existing as a distinct biological person.
IV. BIOLOGICAL AND MORAL DEFINITIONS OF PERSONHOOD
Justice Blackmun wrote “justification [for the State’s duty to protect
prenatal life] rests on the theory that a new human life is present from the
moment of conception.”129 The existence of life from the moment of
conception is also denied because of claimed “problems for precise definition
of this view . . . posed, however, by new embryological data that purport to
indicate that conception is a ‘process’ over time, rather than an event.”130
Justice Blackmun confidently continues, “There has always been strong
support for the view that life does not begin until live birth.”131 The Greek
stoics’ medical knowledge is cited, as well as the prevailing belief for many
centuries life did not begin until quickening.132 Again, belief that life did not
exist prior to quickening is akin to the belief the sun revolved around the earth
prior to Copernicus’ scientific discovery. This section will show scientific
proof conception is not an ongoing event and that human life beginning at
conception is not a theory. It will also show beliefs that life did not begin until
quickening were factually inaccurate and insufficient as proof to conclude the
unborn are undeserving of personhood. This is offered as a persuasive tool,
because if it can be shown life exists prior to birth, which it does, supporting an
argument denying the unborn rights becomes indefensible.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Lugosi, supra note 124, at 172.
See Lugosi, supra note 124, at 172.
Lugosi, supra note 124, at 172.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973) (emphasis added).
Id. at 160–61.
Id. at 160.
Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2016]

A.

A REEXAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERSON

407

Biological Definitions

To provide a framework for discussing what should constitute a ‘person’, it
is necessary to delve into what can be shown through scientific knowledge.
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines person as “a human being”.133
Determining what constitutes a human being is the next step.
In the brief for the appellee, Henry Wade, it was argued, “From conception
the child is a complex, dynamic, rapidly growing organism.”134 At fertilization
a new and unique being is created unlike either parent.135 As early as seventeen
days after implantation in the uterus, the unborn child has blood cells and
possibly a heart.136 Development progresses from there, described by the
Diocesan Attorneys in their brief as “a process of achieving, a process of
becoming the one [the unborn] already is.”137 The unborn child is separate
from its mother and, “however dependent it may be before birth–and for some
years after birth–it is a living being, with its separate growth and development,
with its separate nervous system and blood circulation, with its own skeleton
and musculature, its brain and hearing and vital organs.”138
The idea of legal separability [sic] from the mother for the unborn should
begin where biological separability [sic] begins was expressed by a New York
court in 1953.139 The Court expressed “That it [the unborn] may not live if its
protection and nourishment are cut off earlier than the viable stage of its
development is not to destroy its separability [sic]; it is rather to describe
conditions under which life will not continue.”140 In essence, a two year old is
not viable because it cannot feed itself. But this merely proves a two year old
cannot provide for itself. This fact does not establish the two year old is not a
human being or that it lacks personhood rights.
The appellee brief, after making an extensive medical review of the
unborn, insists on the conclusive nature of the humanity of the fetus.141
“Quickening is only a relative concept” the brief notes, “which depends upon
the sensitivity of the mother, the position of the placenta, and the size of the

133. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, “person”, available at http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/person.
134. Brief for the Appellee at 32, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (No. 70-18) 1971
WL 134281.
135. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 134 at 32.
136. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 134 at 32.
137. Witherspoon, supra note 6, at 65–66 (emphasis added).
138. Witherspoon, supra note 6, at 65.
139. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 134, at 31 (citing Kelly v. Gregory, 282 A.D. 542, 543
(N.Y. App. Div. 1953) where the New York Supreme Court’s appellate division, third department
held a person may recover for a pre-natal injury in the third month of pregnancy).
140. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 134, at 31 (See Kelly, 282 A.D. at 544).
141. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 134, at 53 (citing pages 32 to 53 that extensively
document fetal development from its first days to the final month of gestation).
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child.”142 “The child is as much a child in those several days before birth as he
is those several days after.”143 The appellee brief in support by the Diocesan
Attorneys reflects similar conclusions. After providing their own scientific
data, they conclude it:
Emphasizes [the unborn’s] individuality; its functional unity; its independent
life; its striving, developing nature; its containment of all that it will ever be
essentially in every cell, in every generally human attribute, and in every
individual attribute; its mental growth from as early as the fourth week after
conception; its ability to move its legs, feet, toes, fists, thumbs, head, and lips
by the twelfth week of its existence; its ability to hear and recognize its
144
mother’s voice in the fifth month of its existence . . . .

The Diocesan Attorneys argued all this combined with the judgment made by
the Founding Fathers, their citizen peers in the Common Law, and
philosophers of natural rights required the unborn be recognized as a human
person.145 Each brief for the appellee supported a recognition of the biological
humanity of the unborn. What was argued in 1971 continues to be supported in
2015.
Author William May notes in his book Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of
Human Life that modern science recognizes the biological identity of a new
human individual is present in the zygote resulting from fertilization.146 The
fusion of egg and sperm has two effects; first, by introducing paternally
derived molecules into the network of maternally derived molecules, it initiates
a new structure, an entirely new system or organism.147 Before fertilization, the
egg is a structured collection of inert molecules awaiting activation with a
lifespan around twenty-four hours once it is expelled from the ovary.148 The
egg cannot maintain itself and soon depletes its energy source.149 Fertilization,
however, “triggers a change in the dynamics of the egg by reorganizing and
reactivating the interconnected network of inert maternal molecules in its
contents . . . trigger[ing] the chain of reactions and molecular interactions that
drive cell division and differentiation.”150
“If left alone, this self-driven, self-perpetuating process of molecular
interactions will continue for nine months and beyond, transforming the living
142. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 134, at 54.
143. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 134, at 53-54.
144. Witherspoon, supra note 6, at 72.
145. Id.
146. MAY, supra note 15, at 34.
147. Id. at 165 (May draws from an essay by Nicanor Pier Austriaco, O.P., On Static Eggs
and Dynamic Embryos: A Systems Perspective, THE NATL. CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 2.4, WINTER
2002, 665 summarizing “a systems biology view of the beginning of human life”).
148. Id. (emphasis added to note the egg is a mere cell possessing no life).
149. Id.
150. Id.
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system called an embryo into the living system called a . . . baby” May cites.151
Directly quoting the author of the article, May notes:
Whereas the living system before fertilization only had a lifespan of twentyfour hours, the new living system after fertilization now has a span of seventy
or eighty [years] for those who are strong. Furthermore, since this new system
is capable of independent and self-sustaining existence, it is an organism.
152
Fertilization is the paradigmatic example of cell-to-organism transition.

When an individual human begins to exist is a biological or scientific question,
not a moral one.153
Professor Lugosi similarly relies on science in defining ‘person,’ noting
biology supplies the lowest common denominator of agreement between
reasonable people.154 Human embryology is so advanced there is no doubt a
new human being is created at the time of conception.155 Once the zygote has
been formed, there is a new organism, different from the two gametes taken
separately, but . . . the same individual organism as the adult into whom it later
develops.156 A law must conform to the objective truth of science, so the
meanings of ‘person’ and human being are identical in both law and science.157
Yet Justice Blackmun in Roe evaded determining when life began, claiming
the judiciary could not decide until professionals in medicine, philosophy, and
theology could arrive at a consensus.158 Conveniently, this allows the judiciary
to put off such a determination indefinitely if the Court is so inclined, because
disagreement exists on the biological humanness of the unborn, despite clear
proof to the contrary. And as long as disagreement exists the Court can claim a
lack of consensus and wash its hands of the matter, rather than seek the truth.
The above sources, from the appellee briefs in Roe presenting
embryological data, conclusively support the biological fact that a new human
being exists from conception. Though it may be that when Roe was handed
down there was some question as to how conception occurred, no such
argument can be made today by a rational person. Conception is not an
ongoing process and human life beginning at conception is not a theory.
B.

Moral Approaches

The final persuasive support for the unborn being recognized as persons
rests with a moral argument. Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, in

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

MAY, supra note 15, at 165.
Id.
Id. at 167.
Lugosi, supra note 124, at 123.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 152–153.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
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upholding the central holding of Roe, proclaimed the judiciary’s obligation was
to define the liberty of all, not mandate its own moral code.159 Later the
Justices refer to the importance of precedent, that rule of law under the
Constitution places precedent in an indispensable place.160 To overrule
precedent would require a series of factors to be met: is the precedent’s central
rule unworkable, would the stability of society be damaged by removal of the
precedent, has society moved beyond the precedent, and whether the premises
of fact have changed since the laying of that precedent so as to be
unrecognizable and irrelevant to the issue it addressed?161
The Justices elaborate that to have overruled Roe would reach an
unjustifiable result under principles of stare decisis and would have seriously
weakened the Supreme Court’s ability to exercise the judicial power necessary
for a nation dedicated to the rule of law.162 The Supreme Court must act in a
manner which allows the people to see the Court’s decisions as grounded in
principle and not the result of social or political pressures.163 The Justices
conclude it is a constitutional liberty of a woman to have some freedom to
terminate her pregnancy, and that the basic decision in Roe was based on a
constitutional analysis the Court could not repudiate.164 This basic holding of
Roe being the woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy before viability, was
now a rule of law and a component of liberty the court cannot renounce.165
Professor Lugosi provides a counterpoint to the rule of law reasoning by
the Casey court. He writes:
The ideal of the ‘rule of law’ is to live in a democratic society that places
constitutional limits on the power of government, permanently protects
inalienable human rights and fundamental freedoms from undue
encroachment, and provides equality before laws administered by an
166
independent judiciary.

In contrast, rule by law is the antithesis of a society practicing rule of law; rule
by law is the state where the government exercises arbitrary powers and
abridges at will the inalienable civil rights of any human being.167 Justice is the
defining feature in a rule of law society, whereas deferential, coerced
obedience is the defining feature in a rule by law society.168

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
Id. at 854.
Id. at 855.
Id. at 864–65.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 865–866.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 871.
Lugosi, supra note 124, at 154.
Lugosi, supra note 124, at 154–55.
Lugosi, supra note 124, at 155.
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Professor Lugosi notes his definition of rule of law is not accepted in some
legal circles,169 and argues the Court’s definition of rule of law in Casey is
opposite to his own.170 Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter believed to
overturn Roe would damage the legitimacy of the Supreme Court and the rule
of law,171 but Professor Lugosi asserts “legitimacy is derived by comporting to
the Constitution, and not by acting as a non-elected super-legislature, caving
into political pressure or exercising personal predilections.172 Similarly,
William May points out civil law is subordinate to natural law, and the state
has the obligation to protect the weak from the strong.173 Lugosi cited the
proposition that “[A]lthough religion, law and morals can be separated, they
are nevertheless still very much dependent on each other. Without religion
there can be no morality: and without morality there can be no law.”174
Penned only a few years after the decision in Casey, the Catholic Church
document Evangelium Vitae presents a pertinent religious commentary on law
and democracy. In it, Pope St. John Paul II wrote, “Democracy cannot be
idolized to the point of making it a substitute for morality or a panacea for
immorality.”175 The value of democracy rises or falls with the values it
embodies and promotes.176 “The basis of these values cannot be provisional
and changeable ‘majority’ opinions,” the former pontiff expressed, “but only
the acknowledgement of an objective moral law which, as the ‘natural law’
written in the human heart, is the obligatory point of reference for civil law
itself.”177
It is conceded the purpose of civil law is more limited in scope than that of
the moral law, but the “civil law must ensure that all members of society enjoy
respect for certain fundamental rights which innately belong to the ‘person’,
rights which every positive law must recognize and guarantee.”178 The
foremost of these rights is the inviolable right to life of every innocent human
being.179 Pope St. John Paul II reaches back to St. Thomas Aquinas, a Doctor
and philosopher of the Catholic Church to enumerate:

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Lugosi, supra note 124, at 155.
Lugosi, supra note 124, at 156.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992).
Lugosi, supra note 124, at 160.
MAY, supra note 15, at 41.
Lugosi, supra note 124, at 154 (quoting the words of Lord Denning in his work THE
CHANGING LAW 99 (1952)).
175. Ioannes Paulus PP. II, Evangelium Vitae, VATICAN.VA (Mar. 25, 1995) point 70,
http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evan
gelium-vitae.html.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Paulus PP. II, supra note 16, at point 71.
179. Paulus PP. II, supra note 16, at point 71.
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[H]uman law is law inasmuch as it is in conformity with right reason and thus
derives from the eternal law. But when a law is contrary to reason, it is called
an unjust law, but in this case it ceases to be a law and becomes instead an act
180
of violence.

The Catholic Church recognizes the fundamental right and source of all other
rights is the right to life, and laws legitimizing the direct killing of innocent
human beings through abortion or euthanasia are in complete opposition to the
inviolable right to life proper to every individual.181 Pope St. John Paul II
warned that without an objective moral grounding, not even democracy is
capable of ensuring a stable peace, especially since peace not built upon the
dignity of every human individual frequently proves illusory.182
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Blackmun’s interpretation that ‘person’ did not include the unborn
in the Constitution was incorrectly determined. The appellee briefs submitted
by Henry Wade and the Diocesan Attorneys provided ample evidence of
originalist, textual, and biological evidence supporting the personhood of the
unborn. Behavior by the states to provide protections beyond the Fourteenth
Amendment indicate the personhood of the unborn is still contested forty-two
years later. Twenty-seven states as of last year restricted abortions to such an
extent the Guttmacher Institute deemed them hostile to Roe’s provided
abortion rights. Embryological data, readily available to interested parties,
insists human life begins at conception.
The pertinent point is not whether facts have changed but whether the facts
as they have always existed will be recognized. For many years it was thought
the sun orbited the earth. For many years it was thought life did not exist in the
womb until quickening. That many people erroneously believed the sun orbited
the earth did not make them right. What is right as to the unborn must be
recognized.
The legal fiction that the unborn are not ‘persons’ and receive no rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, while benefiting from state provided
protections, proves inconsistent. Either the unborn are persons and deserve
protection in every area of the law, or they are not and the states must be
forever barred from providing protections to the unborn. Of these two paths the
former is the one right and just. Just law will not reign until the Court properly
recognizes “all men are created equal . . . are endowed by their Creator with

180. Paulus PP. II, supra note 16, at point 72 (citing St. Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae
I–II, q. 93, a. 3, ad 2um).
181. Paulus PP. II, supra note 16, at point 72.
182. Id. at 70.
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certain inalienable rights,” and foremost among these rights is the right to life,
without which no other right matters.
WILLIAM R. AVERY*
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